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Abstract 
 
As platform ecosystems such as Facebook or 
Twitter are rapidly growing through platform users’ 
data contribution, the importance of data governance 
has been highlighted. Platform ecosystems, however, 
face increasing complexity derived from the business 
context such as multiple parties’ participation. How to 
share control and decision rights about data assets 
with platform users is regarded as a significant 
governance design issue. However, there is a lack of 
studies on this issue. Existing design models focus on 
the characteristics of enterprises. Therefore, there is 
limited support for platform ecosystems where there 
are different types of context and complicated 
relationships. To deal with the issue, this paper 
proposes a novel design approach for data governance 
in platform ecosystems including design principles, 
contingency factors and an architecture model. Case 
studies are performed to illustrate the practical 
implications of our suggestion.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Platform is defined as the building blocks that act 
as a foundation upon which an array of firms [1]. It is 
sometimes called a business ecosystem or platform 
ecosystem (PE). PE has recently become a key 
business trend in industry. Sustainable growth of PEs is 
enabled through network effects which are based on 
the interaction of multiple participating groups [2-4]. 
As the popularity of PEs and the value of data in PEs 
are increasing, the concern about data abuse or misuse 
is also growing. Therefore, the role of data governance 
in PEs has received attention since it encourages 
desirable behavior of all participating groups [5].  
Data governance refers to who holds the decision 
rights and is held accountable for decision-making 
about data assets [9]. Traditional data governance 
focuses on data assets within an enterprise, and 
therefore there are simple and clear relationships to be 
addressed. Data governance for PEs, however, should 
consider the different business context and concepts as 
there are the multi-sided networks of participating 
groups and the interactions between them [5]. How to 
partition the decision rights and power of a PE between 
a platform owner and platform users, therefore, 
becomes a big challenge [6, 10]. However, there is 
limited research on this issue. According to the 
analysis on 19 existing industry and academic 
governance frameworks [5], most of them focus on in-
house control for an enterprise. There lacks 
consideration of external participating groups which 
contribute and/or use data in PEs. An elaborate 
analysis of the interaction of roles and responsibilities 
and the design of decision-making structures in the 
context of PE is missing. Prior studies on platform 
governance largely neglect the importance and role of 
data [5, 10]. Those claimed issues are derived from a 
lack of understanding and consideration of data in PEs, 
and the underlying complicated relationship caused by 
multiple participating groups [10]. Designing data 
governance helps deal with the complexity of PEs, and 
focus on identifying fundamental considerations [9]. 
Architecture is a tool for precisely describing data 
governance elements and the interconnections between 
them, and simplifying the complexity when designing 
data governance in PEs [6].  
In this paper, we aim to provide an overall design 
approach for data governance in PEs that can be used 
by practitioners to focus on important data governance 
issues and to develop an effective data governance 
strategy and design for business success. 
The next section provides a literature review. We 
explain the methodology of this study in section 3. 
Section 4 introduces our data governance architecture. 
It presents design principles which should be followed, 
contingency factors to help platform owners’ decision-
making for design choices (centralized or decentralized 
type), and a data governance architecture model. We 
focus on decentralized data governance which needs to 
tackle more complexity. Section 5 shows case studies 
to illustrate the practical implications of our 
suggestion. We then conclude and discuss the 
limitations of the study. 
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2. Literature review  
 
Data governance includes processes, policies and 
structures for comprehensive control. Traditional 
organizations can easily handle participants 
(employees) and the relationship between them. Yet, 
platform owners have limited power and ability to fully 
control platforms as there are multiple parties 
contributing, deriving and using data [5, 7]. In this 
different context, how to design data governance 
effectively aligning the business goals and platform 
concepts have not been discussed in detail. 
Design principles addressed in prior research show 
the fundamental considerations in designing platform 
governance. Transparent, fair, simple, realistic, shared 
value, and participation are identified as the main 
principles [4, 6]. The literature discusses not only the 
principles but also the business influence like costs, 
benefit, or platform growth. However, there is an 
absence of explanation about how the principles can be 
affected by different types of governance design (e.g. 
centralized or decentralized). A data governance type 
is determined by a platform owners’ design choice. 
While centralized governance means that a platform 
owner takes all control and responsibility, 
decentralized governance shares them with platform 
users. A number of studies have addressed design 
choices (how to balance ownership/power of all sides 
in the ecosystems) [6, 10]. Hein et al. [11] addressed 
governance structure, which refers to centralized or 
decentralized governance as a critical mechanism. The 
authors claimed that it involves how the authority and 
responsibility for decision-making is divided among 
participating groups. Schreieck et al. [10] also 
described the distribution of power in PEs. Those prior 
studies, however, do not focus on data, and thus how 
data governance should be designed is not discussed. 
According to “contingency theory”, the relationship 
between some characteristic of an organization and the 
organization’s effectiveness is determined by 
contingencies [40]. The theory respects the fact that 
each PE needs a specific data governance configuration 
by looking at current and future context or strategy. It 
helps platform owners to systematically analyze their 
contingencies and to select a better choice. However, 
the use of the theory in data governance has received 
little attention. Weber et al. [8] applied the theory to 
data governance, and it is reported as the first study. 
The authors proposed a contingency model for 
designing data governance, emphasizing the model 
contributes to the business goals of a company. The 
study has a focus on the general context for an 
enterprise. It lacks consideration of how it can be 
applied in a different business context such as PEs. We 
reviewed literature on PE to find useful ideas, and thus 
to overcome the limitation of the model. A network 
effect for platform‘s growth and profit [2, 13-17], 
platform governance mechanisms and strategies, 
single/multi-homing, platform maturity and open 
strategy [16, 17], control mechanisms [6, 10, 11, 18], 
and different types of market structures [3] are 
addressed as key aspects of platform governance. 
These aspects, however, have not been explained in 
terms of how they are related to data governance.  
Based on the contingencies of PEs, platform 
owners can decide their governance type. When a 
platform owner chooses decentralized data governance, 
he needs to handle a more complex architecture. It is 
necessary to consider the decision domains that need to 
be shared, and who should make the decisions. 
Decision domains of data governance for PEs are 
proposed by Lee et al. [5]. The authors identified seven 
data governance factors for PEs: data ownership/access 
definition, regulatory environment, contribution 
measurement, data use case, conformance, monitoring 
and data provenance. The factors are used to place 
decision rights between platform owners and users at 
design time. A decentralized data governance 
architecture describes all those considerations in a 
structural design to reduce the complexity [6].  
To help successful implementation of a 
decentralized architecture, technical considerations are 
also important. Blockchain is identified as one of the 
possible technologies. It has emerged to support a 
digital currency based on a peer-to-peer network 
without trusted authorities [37]. It has been recently 
highlighted as decentralized governance for data 
provenance or data ownership [37, 39]. Choudary and 
Van Alstyne [4] noted that blockchain is one of the 
most innovative and revolutionary governance forms, 
and supports trustworthy interactions based on 
decentralized architecture. It enables transparent and 
trustworthy governance as any transaction in the 
blockchain is verified by every node, and permanently 
recorded. Based on the mechanisms, Zyskind et al. [39] 
proposed a decentralized personal data management 
system to achieve a transparent data supply chain, data 
ownership and privacy. The data provenance issue is 
addressed in Liang et al. [36] through a provenance 
database and a blockchain network to provide temper-
proof records for transparency of data accountability. 
These studies, however, overlook the complicated 
relationships and context which can occur in PEs 
through multiple participating groups, various types of 
data and a complex data supply chain.  
In conclusion, all available existing data 
governance sources from scholars and practitioners 
only focus on organizational concern. Moreover, 
platform governance studies fall short of attention to 
data governance. 
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3. Methodology  
 
This study is based on two main methodologies: a 
literature review and case study (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Overview of the research process 
 
We conducted three steps for the literature review: 
keyword search, backward and forward search, and 
literature review based on selection criteria. Firstly we 
broadly searched to find the literature which addresses 
PE strategy, governance concepts and mechanisms. 
The main keywords were used “((platform ecosystem 
OR multi-sided platform OR two-sided platform) AND 
(governance OR management))”. The selection criteria 
was “Include concepts, strategy, or governance 
mechanisms in the context of PE”. We excluded the 
papers that are not related to platform governance, too 
high level topics (e.g. overview), specific domains and 
technologies or not academic. We then performed a 
quick review (abstract/introduction/conclusion) 
followed by backward and forward search and a full 
content review. We repeated the three steps to narrow 
down the search scope or to find the literature which 
has specific topic with different keywords and 
selection criteria. For instance, “(blockchain AND 
governance)” were used for our decentralized 
governance architecture model. We chose the papers 
which address data governance domains of PEs such as 
ownership, data provenance or contribution. We also 
used the literature searched in previous studies [5]. 
Case studies were carried out to illustrate our 
suggestion: the contingency factors and decentralized 
governance model. We used currently running or 
developed platforms for the studies. We chose two 
(Platform A and B) undergoing different business 
stages, which provide platforms and support 
participation of multiple user groups. Data collection 
was performed by document analysis (Platform A and 
B), survey of the web sites (Platform A), and 
interviews (Platform B). The context of Platform A 
was described by one of the authors of this paper in the 
beginning as she worked with the platform in the past. 
The interviews for Platform B were conducted with 
two members of the platform, using eight closed/fixed-
response questions and two standardized/open-ended 
questions. We analyzed the collected data using the 
contingency factors and decentralized model. We 
analyzed the influence of the contingency factors on 
the data governance design choices of the platforms, 
and illustrated the possibility of the concept and 
technical requirements of our data governance model.  
 
4. Data governance architecture 
 
4.1. The principles of design  
 
We begin by introducing the principles which 
should be considered for designing good data 
governance in the context of PEs. We identify six 
fundamental principles: transparent, fair, simple, 
realistic, shared value and participation [4, 6]. 
Transparent means that platform governance 
should give a clear view to every participant. It 
includes internal transparency for platform companies 
themselves and external transparency for platform 
users. Fair is relevant to applicable rules for everyone. 
There should not be inconsistent rules, and thus 
governance policies should be equally applied to all 
participating groups. In addition, every participant 
should be given the same opportunity and accessibility. 
Fairness results in more participation and ideas, and 
after all it leads to new innovation [4]. Moreover, it 
makes more wise and productive use of data in PEs 
[34]. Simple presents that data governance in PEs 
should be designed and implemented as efficiently and 
effectively as possible by making its structure simple. 
It is strongly related to costs and benefit of platforms. 
Realistic data governance can be realized by starting 
with a good understanding of what governance 
practices are applicable and how they work based on 
design choices and trend (toward centralized or 
decentralized). Shared value is a management strategy 
which should be delivered to all participants. Data 
governance design, therefore, should contain the 
strategy, and it should be implemented through the 
realized systems. Participation presents that platform 
owners should give all participating groups of PEs a 
chance to join decision-making processes in certain 
ways. In decentralized data governance, it can be 
highly encouraged and implemented. 
The principles should be considered for both design 
types (centralized/decentralized). Yet, the degree of 
achievement of each principle can be different. Figure 
2 shows decentralized data governance supports a 
higher expectation of transparency, shared value and 
participation. If a platform focuses on trust-based 
governance or less/no restriction to platform users, the 
platform is more visible and easy to participate and 
have a common consensus between participants. It is 
made possible by sharing power and control of 
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decision-making with platform users. In decentralized 
data governance, platform owners should understand, 
consider, and reflect platform users’ needs and 
characteristics, and it might be more difficult than in 
centralized data governance. Thus, it can lead to less 
realistic data governance. In contrast, centralized data 
governance enables simpler and more realistic data 
governance since platform owners do not need to 
consider platform users’ issues as much. “Fair” might 
not be affected by any design choice. 
 
 
Figure 2. Design choices and principles 
 
4.2. Contingency factors  
 
Depending on platform owners’ design choice, 
platforms can expect different advantages (Table 1). It 
is necessary to think about what platform contingencies 
affect design choices to find the best choice and thus to 
get business success of each PE (Figure 3). 
 
Table 1. Centralized vs. decentralized governance 
Perspective 
Design  
Platform owners  Platform users 
Centralized  
data 
governance 
Pros Easy to control user 
behaviors and to align 
business goals/strategies 
High quality of data or 
services (including strong 
security) 
Cons Slow growing and lots of 
resources  
Invisible platforms, lack of 
trust and accessibility 
Decentralized 
data 
governance 
Pros Reduce effort, increase 
growing and user 
satisfaction/participation  
Enhance trust and increase 
motivation and benefit 
expectation 
Cons Hard to control platforms 
and user behaviors and to 
change goals/strategies 
Complicated processes, 
slow decision-making and 
less secure 
 
 
Figure 3. Design choices and contingency factors 
 
To support right decision-making of platform 
owners, we suggest the contingency factors which are 
adopted from a previous contingency model for data 
governance (Weber et al. model) [8] and platform 
governance studies [2-4, 6, 8-11, 13, 16-21, 27, 29, 31-
33]. Weber et al.’s model provides generic contingency 
factors for an enterprise which are derived from prior 
research and workshops with practitioners. The factors 
are identified for data governance, and thus useful as a 
basis of this study. We differentiate them by focusing 
on platform governance characteristics (Figure 4). 
 
Weber et al.’s  
contingency factors 
→ 
Contingency factors for PEs 
(our suggestion) 
Performance strategy Platform strategy Modified 
Diversification breath Multi-homing strategy Modified 
Degree of market regulation Degree of market regulation Selected 
Organization structure Governance configuration Modified 
Competitive strategy Platform market structure Modified 
Process harmonization Process harmonization Deleted 
 Open strategy (new) Added 
Platform maturity (new) Added 
Figure 4. Contingency factors 
 
First of all, we examined Weber et al.’s model to 
select applicable factors for PEs. We selected “degree 
of market regulation” as regulatory environment is also 
an important factor in using data in PEs [5]. Secondly, 
we removed “process harmonization” because it refers 
to business processes of an enterprise. Next, we 
modified the remaining factors to adjust to PEs’ 
situations through a literature review. Four factors 
were modified: “platform strategy”, “multi-homing 
strategy”, “governance configuration” and “platform 
market structure”. The factors align with the basic 
concepts of Weber et al.’s model, but they differ in the 
definition and range of each factor. Lastly, we found 
new factors which are not addressed in the referred 
model. We identified two factors (“open strategy” and 
“platform maturity”) as new factors. The factors are 
commonly discussed when addressing platform 
governance in academic literature. In total, we identify 
seven contingency factors which influence the design 
choices of data governance in PEs (Table 2).  
Platform strategy— Weill and Ross [13] addressed 
profit and growth of organizations to measure IT 
governance performance. Weber et al. [8] adopted this 
concept to data governance contingency. The authors 
noted that if an organization focuses on profit, the 
decision-making authority in governance will be 
toward centralization. In contrast, if growth is 
emphasized, the governance will be decentralized. In 
the context of PEs, however, profit and growth can be 
achieved at the same time thanks to network effects of 
PEs. As PEs are increasing revenue based on data from 
platform users, low quality of data issues are also 
rising [19]. Some platforms have addressed the issues 
by adopting formal control or monitoring to drive out 
low quality data [8].  However, strict control for high 
quality in centralized governance can make
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Table 2. Contingency factors for data governance in PEs 
Contingency factor Definition (trend: centralized <-> decentralized) Relevant data governance factor Reference 
Platform strategy Performance objective of a PE  
(quality <-> profit or growth) 
Data ownership/access definition, data use case, 
conformance, monitoring 
[3, 8, 13, 19] 
Multi-homing strategy Degree of affiliation in a PE (single-home <-> multi-home) Data ownership/access definition and use case  [8, 16, 17] 
Degree of market regulation Degree of regulation regarding the use of data in a PEs  
(highly regulated <-> no regulation) 
regulatory environment, conformance [8, 9, 27,  29, 30] 
Governance 
Configuration 
Governance 
mechanisms 
Type of governance of a PE  
(authority-based <- contract-based -> trust-based) 
governance) 
Contribution measurement, conformance, monitoring, 
data provenance 
[6, 18, 20, 21] 
Control 
mechanisms   
Typ  of control of a PE (formal <-> informal control) Data ownership/access definition, conformance, 
monitoring, data provenance 
Platform market structures Type of platform market structures based on competition 
(monopoly platforms <- intersecting -> coincident) 
Data ownership/access definition, data use case, 
monitoring, data provenance 
[3, 17, 31] 
Open strategy Level of openness of a PE (close <-> open) Data ownership/access definition, data use case, 
monitoring, data provenance 
[4, 10, 11, 17, 32] 
Platform maturity Level of maturity of a PE (mature platforms <-> immature) Contribution measurement, monitoring, data provenance [2, 4, 10, 11, 17, 33] 
 
platform growth slow. Multi-homing strategy— 
Some platform owners require their partners to 
affiliate exclusively with them to offer novel content 
(single-home). Meanwhile, some platforms allow 
affiliation with competing platforms to encourage 
participation (multi-home): e.g. multiple payment 
cards in EBay [3, 17]. Multi-homing is related to 
openness. If a platform chooses “open”, less 
permission rule to the users is followed [16, 17]. It 
means governance should move toward 
decentralization to share decision rights [6]. Degree 
of market regulation— This factor is adopted from 
the existing model [8] as it is consistent with concern 
of regulatory environment of data governance in PEs 
[5]. A highly regulated environment requires more 
centralized data governance for compliance. On the 
contrary, less (or no) regulation might enable 
platform owners to divide decision rights through a 
decentralized approach. Governance 
configuration— Governance mechanisms can be 
categorized into three: authority-based, contract-
based and trust-based [18, 20]. Authority-based 
mechanisms can be realized within centralized 
governance by employing the platform owner’s 
power to enforce desirable behavior based on 
policies. Trust-based mechanisms are used for 
gaining a certain amount of participants, and then 
attracting other side users. The mechanisms are 
generally combined with strong incentives to reach 
the desired goal [2, 18]. In general, authority-based 
mechanisms are related to formal control like input, 
output or behavior control, but trust-based 
mechanisms are enabled by informal control such as 
clan/social control [18, 21] in decentralized 
governance. A contract-based mechanism needs less 
formality, but still prohibits the unauthorized 
behavior in using data in platforms. Platform market 
structures— Platform market structures (coincident, 
intersecting, and monopoly) have been addressed 
under platform competition concerns [3]. Coincident 
platforms are recognized when there is too much 
competition in the market; supply sides (n) > demand 
sides (m). Monopoly refers to having no competition: 
n = 1. Coincident platforms (in particular, entrants) 
might be necessary to be more attractive than 
incumbent platforms. They tend to be open and share 
the platforms to encourage users’ participation and to 
win market [17]. Monopoly leans to centralized 
governance to strictly control the platforms. Open 
strategy— Open strategy is an important part of the 
design of a PE [10, 11]. A platform owner opens the 
platform when there is lack of resources, need for 
adoption or innovation [17]. If the degree of openness 
increases, platform users can easily access the 
platforms, and platform owners need to share control 
with users [10]. In consequence, it is toward 
decentralized. Yet, limited openness leads to high 
process control, quality and user satisfaction: e.g. 
Apple’s app store [4, 11]. Platform maturity— A 
newcomer platform has more permissive governance 
to enhance participation and to reach critical mass 
when market share is small [17]. To attain enough 
growth, a platform owner needs less restriction but 
more trust to attract and lock the users in the platform 
[4, 10]. In particular, trust is regarded as a 
prerequisite for a PE to survive among competitors 
[10, 11, 33]. Thus, less mature platforms tend to 
prefer multi-homing, open and less negotiation (share 
control) to capture the benefits of growth. In contrast, 
when market share is large enough (at maturity), 
governance has a tendency to be toward tighter 
control [17]. 
As shown in Table 2, each contingency has a 
relationship with particular data governance factors. 
The data governance factors should be focused and 
enforced based on the linked contingency. For 
instance, if a platform aims for high quality 
performance, the platform needs to strengthen data 
ownership and access control based on clear data use 
cases [9, 13, 22, 23] for strict responsibility and 
accountability of data quality [19]. Conformance and 
monitoring should also be followed to improve 
quality. Meanwhile, a PE which adopts a trust-based 
governance needs to think about a certain reward for 
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data contributors to encourage participants [18, 24, 
25]. Shared conformance, monitoring and data 
provenance should be considered to achieve visibility 
of a data supply chain for trust between a platform 
owner and users [26-28]. In the same vein, degree of 
market regulation is strongly related to regulatory 
environment and conformance to avoid serious court 
issues [9, 27, 29, 30]. 
 
4.3. Data governance architecture model 
      
A centralized governance architecture is simpler 
as there are only internal issues to consider. In 
contrast, a decentralized architecture needs to deal 
with complicated relationships and interactions 
among multi-sided networks of participants. To cope 
with this complexity, we present how to partition data 
governance control power with platform users. We 
then propose a decentralized architecture model and 
the technical considerations. Blockchain is 
introduced as a possible technology which can 
support our model. 
 
4.3.1. The locus of data governance. To encourage 
participation of platform users and to achieve 
visibility of PEs, some governance practices need to 
be directly implemented by platform users. We 
partition the governance factors and practices 
introduced in the literature review section (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Data governance partitioning 
Governance 
factor 
Locus of data governance 
Platform owner side Platform user side 
Data owner-
ship/access 
. Define data ownership and 
access rights 
. View data ownership and 
access rights 
Regulatory 
environment 
. Identify relevant 
regulations, laws or cases  
. Develop/use decision 
models for data owner-
ship/access definition 
- 
Contribution 
measurement 
. Develop contribution 
measurement models  
. Measure/notify the 
contribution to the owner 
 
 
. Measure the contribution of 
data 
Data use case . Define data categories and 
use cases 
. View the defined 
categories and use cases 
Conformance . Build processes/rules 
. Audit processes/rules 
 
. Audit processes/rules 
Monitoring . Monitor/view all data 
activities(events)  
. Notify specific events to the 
data owner 
. Review user report and 
response to the reporter 
. Monitor/view activities (or 
events) regarding uploaded 
/generated user data 
 
. Report misuse/abuse of 
data 
Data 
Provenance 
. Identify or authenticate data 
owner 
. Trace the history of the 
used of data 
 
Platform owners should carefully consider the 
regulatory environment to correctly define data 
ownership and access rights based on the identified 
legal aspects [9]. Platform owners also need to define 
how to use the data in PEs for business goals. 
Understanding and defining different types/sources of 
data are thus very important to platform owners [9, 
35]. In these cases, platform users’ participation is 
little. However, the mechanisms and consequence of 
decision-making by platform owners should be 
disclosed to all participant groups [5]. In addition, 
platform users also need to clearly know and 
understand who, when and how uses their data [26]. 
However, prior research and case studies claim a lack 
of user contribution model and invisible data usage as 
critical challenges [5, 10, 24-26] even though user 
contribution measurement has been considered as a 
key mechanism to support revenue sharing and 
business success [5, 24, 25]. To encourage high 
visibility and fair and clear contribution 
measurement, decentralized data governance should 
play a critical role by enabling platform users to 
monitor and validate the whole process and history of 
the use of data in a supply chain [6, 9, 26]. 
 
4.3.2. Architecture overview. As illustrated in 
Figure 5, we suggest our decentralized model for PEs 
based on the design principles and data governance 
partitioning mentioned in the previous sections.  
 
 
Figure 5. Decentralized data governance 
  
There are three main entities, which interact with 
each other: platform users (data providers, consumers 
and user groups), closed and open data governance. 
The closed governance is for platform owners. It 
supports internal practices like data ownership/access 
definition and contribution models. The open data 
governance enables every platform user to fairly 
access platform data and transparently see or audit all 
activities and events of platforms. The following 
describes the interactions in detail. 
(0) Platform owners should set up environment 
prior to occurrence of the interactions. It includes 
developing models for data ownership/access and 
contribution measurement, and defining data 
categories/use cases, aligning the business objectives 
and strategies. (1) Data providers can upload or 
generate during their use of PEs. The data is stored in 
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the closed data governance systems as raw data. (2) 
The information of raw data is registered in the open 
data governance as a form of metadata according to 
the predefined data categories and the purpose of the 
use of data. The registered data is exposed to any 
platform users who want to use them. (3) Data 
consumers can search and require the registered data. 
(4) Verifying data integrity, checking access 
permission, and auditing the processes are 
implemented by platform user groups through the 
open data governance systems to avoid data abuse or 
misuse (To enable user groups’ participation for these 
activities, some technical considerations and 
mechanisms should be considered. We will discuss 
this in the next section in detail). (5) In order to check 
data access permission, the closed data governance 
should provide correct information of raw data based 
on the data ownership and access definition. (6)(7) 
According to the feedback of the open data 
governance, data consumers can receive the data via 
the raw data repository in the closed data governance. 
(8) Platform owners measure the contribution and 
reward the contributors as they create or add value in 
the use of data. (9) The owners of the data can see all 
the events and trace the history of the use of the data 
during the transaction and/or after. Furthermore, the 
open data governance can automatically measure the 
contribution of data based on the usage of data.  
This model highly enhances transparency and 
participation of PEs by providing an open data 
governance platform. All participating groups can 
share control, value and culture, and clearly see the 
use of data. Platform owners can reduce costs and 
efforts by partially handing over some parts of their 
control power to platform users. 
 
4.3.3. Technical considerations. To discuss how the 
suggested model is implemented, we identify the 
technical requirements. Firstly, the open data 
governance should be completely open to every 
platform user. It also should be decentralized without 
any intervention of platform owners. Meanwhile, the 
closed data governance needs to be invisible and 
protected. The two separated governances, however, 
have to cooperate/collaborate with each other to keep 
consistency and integrity of data, and seamless 
services. Secondly, security issues should be 
considered as the governance model allows any 
participants (platform users) to join the open data 
governance system. To support this, all 
activities/events which take place in PEs have to be 
safely preserved/recorded. It can also improve clear 
data ownership and provenance. The recording can 
be used to prevent or detect denial of data usage or 
data manipulation by someone including platform 
owners. This is important because it is necessary to 
improve transparency of PEs, where there are 
multiple participating groups and thus there are 
worries of data abuse/misuse and privacy violation 
[5]. Lastly, decision making by user groups by 
auditing the processes/data should be clear and 
stable, and implemented by reasonable mechanisms.  
Blockchain technology meets the requirements 
mentioned above. It provides a shared and distributed 
architecture [36-39]. Based on the concept, the 
hashed data of raw data (uploaded data by platform 
users) can be generated and transferred to the open 
data governance. This enables the two governance 
(closed and open) to be independent, but still keeps 
data security, consistency and integrity by verifying 
the hash code against the raw (original) data. Once 
the hashed data embedded in the transaction by the 
blockchain network (the open data governance in our 
model), the data becomes immutable. This is possible 
since every participant of the blockchain network 
stores the data as a form of a cryptographically-
signed chain. Thus, it is nearly impossible to change 
the data [37] unless someone can own enough 
computational power to invalidate the chain. This 
mechanism satisfies our needs regarding security and 
data provenance. In addition, auditing every 
transaction for the use of data and making a decision 
can be conducted by every participant’s voting. It is 
implemented with clear rules without platform 
owners’ intervention. Therefore it is regarded as a 
trustworthy and transparent mechanism. 
 
5. Case study  
 
We conduct case studies on two platforms 
(Platform A and B). First of all, we compare the 
platforms based on our contingency factors (Table 4). 
We illustrate how the governance design types are 
characterized depending on the different context. 
Secondly, we analyze Platform B in detail to show 
the practical implication of the decentralized 
architecture model suggested here. 
Platform A is a content portal which was 
launched four years ago. Through the platform, 
software assets (development knowledge or 
documents) are provided and reused by IT companies 
or individual developers. To encourage user 
participation, it provides several types of benefits to 
the participants: e.g. subsidy and seeding like UI/UX 
guide. The government supports the platform by 
legislating the rule that every government SW R&D 
project should register the outcome to the platform. 
According to the result of the case study, Platform A 
tends toward centralized. The market regulation and 
platform maturity of the platform lead 
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Table 4. The results of the case studies on platform A and platform B 
Platform A -> Toward “Centralized Data Governance” Platform B -> Toward “Decentralized Data Governance” 
Contingency factors and the context Trend  Contingency factors and the context Trend  
* Platform strategy: Quality 
The business goal is reputation and satisfaction of users. Thus, it 
aims at high quality of data rather than growth of the platform. Profit 
is not considered as the platform is a non-profit platform. 
Centralized * Platform strategy: Growth 
The purpose of the platform is to share as much data as possible, 
and the quality of data is not a big concern of the platform.  
Thus, it aims at growth of the platform. 
Decentralized 
*Multi-homing strategy: Single-home 
It tends to prohibit multi-homing for high reputation/differentiation. 
Centralized *Multi-homing strategy: Multi-home 
In order to open the platform to everyone and to gain more data 
from providers, the platform allows multi-homing. 
Decentralized 
*Degree of market regulation: No (less) regulation 
Every uploaded data is public data based on the prerequisite of the 
platform policies (except user information). There is less amount of 
sensitive data: e.g. personal identifiable information. 
Decentralized *Degree of market regulation: No (less) regulation 
The data stored in the platform is basically public data to open to 
everyone as there is no raw data and personal information. The 
platform has only metadata provided by data owners.  
Decentralized 
*Governance configuration: Authority-based/Formal control 
There are strict/formal control processes and clear ownership 
mechanisms by the platform owner. 
Centralized *Governance configuration: Trust-based/Informal control 
Reputation mechanisms will be used by platform users. Users’ 
reputation score can be used for input control by the government. 
Decentralized 
*Platform market structures: Monopoly 
As the platform is supported by the government, the platform 
dominates the market as a monopoly platform.  
Centralized *Platform market structures: Intersecting 
There are some identified competitors (e.g. data.gov.au and the 
other government platforms). However, there is no serious 
competition. 
Blended 
*Open strategy: Close 
It tends to open to demand side users, but still requires login first 
(only authorized users can access to the platform for the use of data 
in the platform). For supply side, the platform is relatively closed as 
it requires high quality and reputation. 
Centralized *Open strategy: Open 
The strategy of the platform is completely open. There is no any 
restriction to join the platform, and thus everyone can equally use 
the data in the platform. Platform users only need to login using 
blockchain accounts. 
Decentralized 
*Platform maturity: Immature 
The platform launched four years ago, but it is still considered as an 
immature platform due to the growth rate of data and users.  
Decentralized *Platform maturity: Immature 
The platform has not started its business yet.  
Decentralized 
 
to decentralized governance, but the other factors show 
centralized governance trend of the platform. 
Meanwhile, Platform B has not officially started the 
service yet. The project team recently finished the 
prototype system, and thus it is in the very initial 
phase. The platform is an open data registry platform. 
It allows data owners to upload data, and data analysts 
can use the data for analytics jobs. The data owners can 
monetize their data since it provides payment systems. 
According to the interviews and document review, the 
governance trend is decentralized. The vision of the 
platform is open, and thus it aims to share data with 
every participant. Since the governance trend of 
Platform B is identified as decentralized, we carry out 
an in-depth analysis to illustrate how our decentralized 
model (Figure 5) can be implemented in the real world. 
We survey the platform in three dimensions: 
architecture, process and function.  
Architecture— Platform B is developed based on 
blockchain. There are two entities named “on-chain 
and off-chain” based on the existence of a blockchain 
network. In the off-chain (without a blockchain 
network), there are hosted raw data, and usage policy 
specification and a policy checker. Meanwhile, dataset 
and analytics job registries which interact with data 
consumer (data analyst) and data provider are in the 
on-chain. The on-chain also includes modules for 
tamper-proof and payment to support high security and 
monetization. Process— Data providers can register 
datasets on blockchain. Data consumers can post 
analytics jobs with the requirements and measurement 
criteria of datasets. They can select the datasets which 
meets the requirements among the registered datasets. 
The platform conducts policy compliance checking to 
validate if the access to the datasets is valid. Lastly, the 
data analysts run the analytics jobs with the datasets, 
and pay for the datasets. Function— The main 
functions of the platform are dataset and analytics job 
registration, policy checking and payment. The 
additional functions are dashboards for data consumers 
and data owners. It supports presentation views which 
show the results of data searching and policy checking, 
the contribution of each dataset selected by data 
consumers, and the profit of data owners. 
The overall concept is similar to our architecture 
model. Raw data is stored in the off-chain and only 
metadata is provided to the on-chain network. This 
mechanism helps more privacy of datasets as it stays 
far from direct exposure to public. The platform 
utilizes advantages of blockchain such as transparency, 
secure and stable services, or fairness. This case can be 
a good reference of a practical governance model 
which can be used in industry.  However, there are 
some limitations which should be dealt with for PEs. 
First of all, there is a lack of consideration of a 
scalability issue. Majority PEs may produce a large 
amount of data every day, and have various types of 
data. For instance, Facebook has more than 70 
categories of data [5]. All types of data do not need to 
be opened to or shared with platform users. It is 
necessary to categorize and filter data before 
transferring them to an open platform. It is able to 
reduce the burden of data processing for better 
performance. Secondly, while the open data registry 
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focuses on simple and clear data ownership and 
contribution, data governance in PEs should deal with 
multiple parties contributing, deriving and using data. 
This concern results in complicated relationships, 
ownership and contribution measurement [5]. Platform 
B, in particular, cannot answer the question of how to 
measure the contribution of shared or derived data 
which may involve multiple data owners through 
transformation or analysis. Lastly, the policy 
compliance checker is only applicable for tabular data 
focusing on ETL (extract, transform and load) phase. 
As PEs generally deal with various types of data 
including video, audio, text and geographic data. 
Different mechanisms should be adopted.  
To sum up our case studies, we showed that our 
contingency factors are applicable to systematically 
analyze and characterize the data governance design of 
PEs. For currently running platforms (e.g. Platform A), 
the contingency factors can be used to review current 
governance direction. For a newcomer (e.g. Platform 
B), it enables to examine if the vision and strategies of 
the platform align with the data governance design 
choice. The interviewees gave a positive feedback that 
our suggestion is effective and useful to analyze their 
context and to help decision-making for governance 
design choices. One interviewee noted that different 
types of users (providers and consumers) need to be 
considered when analyzing the governance 
configuration. We also illustrated the concept and 
technical approach of our architecture model by in-
depth analysis of Platform B. The interviewee’s 
comment and the identified limitations from the case 
studies will be addressed in the future research. 
 
6. Conclusion and limitations  
      
In this paper, we proposed a data governance 
architecture for PEs. We discussed data governance 
design choices (centralized or decentralized), and 
contingency factors to support decision-making. We 
also proposed an architecture model for decentralized 
data governance based on the design principles 
suggested in this paper. We introduced blockchain 
technologies which support our model. To illustrate the 
practical implications of our suggestion, we carried out 
case studies on two platform ecosystems.  
In order to provide in-depth understanding and 
knowledge of data governance and PE, we conducted a 
literature review following three steps: keyword 
search, backward/forward search and literature review. 
The suggested contingency factors which influence 
data governance design of PEs, were differentiated 
from prior studies based on the characteristics, 
strategy, and governance concepts and mechanisms of 
PEs. The case studies were performed by applying our 
contingency factors with survey and interviews. We 
showed how the factors can be used in the real world. 
The decentralized governance model was also 
illustrated through a case study on a blockchain-based 
system which implements decentralized data 
governance. We also identified significant challenges 
which should be addressed in the future research.  
This study has several limitations. The case studies 
conducted are not sufficient to validate our models. 
One of the case studies was carried out using a 
qualitative description of the author’s working 
experiences and information from the document 
analysis. We conducted only two interviews for the 
other case. In addition, our architecture model should 
be implemented to clearly show if the model is 
applicable in the real world. At the same time, an 
extensive and a systematic literature review should be 
considered to refine our study. 
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